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1 Introduction
During the last two decades, public firms in the U.S. increasingly created incentives for
their executives with performance related compensation while improvements in corporate
governance to prevent adverse managerial behavior have been rather scarce. According to
an estimate, the median share of performance payments in S&P 500 firms increased from
58 to 83 percent between 1992 and 2008.1 Moreover, governance provisions working in
favor of managerial entrenchment typically have not been removed but rather augmented.
The U.S. corporate governance index from Bebchuk et al. (2009) indicates that on average,
entrenchment opportunities became inferior in public firms during the last two decades.
Besides these developments inside executive suites, the market environment has been
changing substantially for these corporations. First, increasing globalization led to rises in
the effective market size served by large U.S. firms. Second, technological change driven by
the rapid development of information technologies induced productivity increases within
I.T. using firms. Labor economists frequently argue that globalization and skill-biased
technological change have been major triggers of increases in the level and the slope of
compensation at the very top of the income distribution.2 However, the understanding
how these developments affect the way how firms create incentives for human capital
is rather scant. Why did firms not improve their quality of corporate governance over
time to incentivize managers with better control mechanisms? In this paper, I study if
changes in the market environment through international trade and technological change
can influence the way how firms create incentives for human capital.
In the first part of the paper, I propose a model with heterogeneous firms and human cap-
ital that incorporates agency problems. In my model, firms make an ex ante investment
decision on the level of corporate governance when they enter the market. Higher levels of
corporate governance reduce agency problems as corporate governance allows for a better
monitoring of prospective managers and therefore reduces the managers’ incentives to be-
have adversely. Firms then match with agents which are employed as managers and agents
employed as production workers, where the quality of production technologies and the skill
level of the manager jointly determine the productivity of firms. Technologies and man-
agement skills are both complements such that a positive assortative assignment arises.
To determine the distribution of managerial reservation wages in equilibrium, I borrow
from the literature on the assignment of managers to firms and make use of the positive
1See Frydman and Jenter (2010) who document the historical development of U.S. executive compen-
sation.
2See for instance Baldwin and Cain (2000) who study the roles of trade and technology for shifts in
relative U.S. wages, Bell and Van Reenen (2013) who study the role of globalization on extreme wage
inequality in top management or Cuñat and Guadalupe (2005, 2009) who study the effects of globalization
on incentive provisions.
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assortative matching of management skills to production technologies (see Monte (2011),
Gabaix and Landier (2008) or Terviö (2008)). An assignment implies that the marginal
cost of a slightly higher skilled manager is equal to the marginal benefit of this manager in
a competitive labor market equilibrium. Therefore, managerial reservation wages depend
on the productivity of managers and thus on their individual skill level, the production
technology of the firm and market characteristics. In addition to the upfront investment
into the corporate governance quality, firms offer bonus payments to incentivize their man-
agers to exert effort. While corporate governance and performance compensation act as
substitutes regarding the provision of incentives, the managers’ reservation wages impair
this substitutability when higher demand for human capital constrains firms to compen-
sate managers at higher levels. Consequently, firms competing for managers with the
highest skill levels in the economy offer more performance compensation and leave more
discretion to their human capital as they make lower ex ante investments into monitoring.
The paper proceeds with two comparative static exercises. First, I consider the effects of
skill-biased technological change on corporate governance investments and performance
payments in a closed economy setting. More specifically, I model skill-biased technological
change as an increase in the effectiveness of production technologies leading to relatively
larger benefits for higher skilled managers. Second, I extend the model to an open economy
version with two symmetric countries and intra-industry trade (see also Monte (2011) who
studies how trade and technological change affect the wage dispersion of human capital
in a setting without agency problems). The open economy version of the model allows
me to study how a trade integration, modeled as a trade cost reduction, affects firm
decisions on the creation of incentives. Both, trade and skill-biased technological change
raise the competition for the highest skilled managers in the economy. Better access to
foreign markets for the largest firms in the economy and an increase in the effectiveness of
production technologies both increase the marginal productivity of human capital and thus
induce an upward shift in reservation wages at the top of the skill distribution. These
increases in reservation wages induce companies to respond with a rise in performance
payments leading to a crowding out of investments into corporate governance.
The comparative static analysis relates to two prominent and competing explanations for
the rise of executive compensation during the previous decades: managerial power ver-
sus labor market competition. On the one hand, some economists argue that the rise of
executive compensation is due to more powerful managers who can influence their com-
pensation contracts and easily extract rents from the firm (see Bebchuk and Fried (2003)).
On the other hand, another strand of literature claims that competition for managerial
talent, induced by a larger market capitalization of firms, can account for the rise in exec-
utive pay (see Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Terviö (2008)). My model combines both
strands: trade and new technologies induced changes in the market environment of firms.
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These changes have triggered a shift in the demand for managerial talent such that firms
endogenously allowed for more managerial discretion and increased performance payments
at the top.
In the second part of the paper, I construct a panel of large public industrial firms from
the U.S. between 1993 and 2006 with information on managerial entrenchment opportu-
nities and CEO compensation. Combined with information on trade openness and the
importance of I.T. at the industry level, I empirically analyze the comparative statics
of the model. My empirical results suggest that variation in firms’ exposure to trade or
I.T. leads to adjustments of corporate governance provisions and CEO compensation over
time. I find that firms allow for more managerial entrenchment, proxied by the entrench-
ment index by Bebchuk et al. (2009), and offer higher CEO pay when their industries
become more open to trade or when industries become more I.T. intensive. Both, trade
openness and I.T. intensity are measured at the sectoral level, where trade openness is the
share of exports relative to the domestic market size of the industry and the I.T. intensity
is the fraction of I.T. investments in total capital formation of the industry. In order to
address potential sources of endogeneity in measuring the effects of trade, I employ an
instrumental variable strategy, where trade openness is instrumented with variation in
ad valorem maritime transport costs and a real effective exchange rate basket of trading
partner currencies.
This paper covers a question at the intersection of organizational and international eco-
nomics and thus relates to various strands of the literature on the effects of trade and
technological change on firm organization and corporate finance.
First, I contribute to the literature that considers incentive compensation in general equi-
librium trade models. Wu (2011) and Chen (2014) focus on the managerial incentive
provision in firms with moral hazard in general equilibrium models of intra-industry trade
and firm heterogeneity à la Melitz (2003). Gersbach and Schmutzler (2014) show how
the global integration of product and labor markets increases the heterogeneity of CEO
remuneration in a model with Cournot competition. While these models study a trade-
induced dispersion of compensation, the focus of this paper is on the endogenous choice of
the channel how firms offer incentives: either with investments into corporate governance
or via performance compensation.
Second, the paper relates to the literature that links the decision to delegate authority in-
side firms to globalization and the technological frontier. Marin and Verdier (2008, 2012,
2014) show that globalization affects the delegation of formal and real authority in orga-
nizations. They embed the allocation of formal decision authority à la Aghion and Tirole
(1997) into models of international trade and explain how economic integration leads to
the delegation of power inside firms. However, since agents are infinitely risk-averse with
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respect to income, performance payments cannot be used to create incentives. Conse-
quently, these models do not draw inferences on the choice between managerial discretion
and performance pay. Additionally, the quality of managerial talent is homogenous such
that variation across firms within industries is absent. Marin et al. (2015) investigate
how the allocation of power inside firms is affected by offshoring managers or production
tasks in a small open economy model. Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) show that
exporting firms increase the control span of managers and the number of management
layers within their hierarchies after trade liberalizations. Acemoglu et al. (2007) analyze
how technology diffusion affects firm decentralization. They argue that decision rights
are more decentralized when private information of agents is crucial. Consequently, the
delegation of authority is more likely when firms are relatively close to the technological
frontier such that technologies are not public knowledge. Compared to their model, tech-
nologies play a different role in this chapter. While the quality of ideas and managerial
skills are modeled as complementary inputs in my model, the complexity of technologies
and the quality of the managerial talent is exogenous in their paper. I add an integrated
view to this literature that considers both, the choice of corporate governance and per-
formance payments which are subject to labor market outcomes. This allows to draw
novel conclusions about the effects of trade and technological change on the substitution
patterns between payments and governance to provide incentives.
Third, the empirical analysis in this paper relates to several empirical studies on the
effects of product markets on either managerial power or incentive compensation. Here,
the literature has primarily focused on the delegation of decision authority as a particular
dimension of managerial power. Bloom et al. (2010) and Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) use
data on the organization of firms to show how more import penetration leads to flatter
firm hierarchies and more decentralized decision making. Marin and Verdier (2014) show
that German and Austrian multinationals have a more decentralized organization when
they are faced by a stronger trade exposure. Cuñat and Guadalupe (2005) consider the
appreciation of the British Pound as a quasi-natural experiment to quantify the effect
of product market competition on executive performance pay within a panel of British
manufacturing firms. They find that the implied import competition shock led to a higher
pay to performance sensitivity for managers in more open sectors.
Fourth, the paper is also methodically related to recent research on assignment models
that consider corporate finance decisions of the firm. Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013) present
a model where CEOs and firms form matches based on multiple characteristics to explain
low turnover rates in an industry equilibrium. Bénabou and Tirole (2013) analyze the
impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technological change on the structure
of compensation in a Hotelling framework. They demonstrate that competition for talent
shifts effort from less easily contractible tasks, like long-term investments, towards more
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easily contractible tasks. In addition Baranchuk et al. (2011), Edmans et al. (2009) and
Falato and Kadyrzhanova (2012) develop industry equilibrium models with moral hazard
problems to show how CEO compensation interacts with the industry environment of
firms. Dicks (2012) establishes a role for corporate governance regulation in an industry
equilibrium model with moral hazard and assignment of CEOs to firms. Acemoglu and
Newman (2002) consider the impact of labor supply and demand on the corporate struc-
ture of firms and show how the outside option of production workers affects production
worker monitoring.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model and the comparative static
analyses are presented in the following section 2. Section 3 describes the data, empirical
modeling strategy and presents empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
In this section, I present a theoretical model that allows to analyze how the market
environment affects firms’ decisions to provide incentives for managers. In the model, firms
with heterogeneous production technologies compete for managers with heterogeneous
levels of management skills. In order to produce output, managers need to exert effort.
Since managerial effort is not directly observable, firm owners need to provide incentives
with performance payments and ex ante investments in corporate governance to improve
the monitoring of managers.
In the model, trade liberalizations and technological change increase the competition for
management skills. This raises the reservation wages for the highest skilled managers
and crowds out corporate governance investments. I show that these effects of trade
liberalizations and technological change on the agency problems inside firms ultimately
lead to a higher fraction of firms in the economy that do not invest in corporate governance.
I begin with a closed economy setting. I follow Acharya et al. (2013) in modeling the
organization of firms subject to moral hazard. This agency problem inside the firm is
subsequently introduced into an economy that is endowed with heterogeneous manage-
ment skills and production technologies à la Monte (2011). Complementarities in the
effectiveness of managerial skills and production technologies lead to a positive assorta-
tive matching of managers to production technologies which determines the reservation
wages of managers and the level of corporate governance investments by firms. The equi-
librium is then determined by labor market clearing and zero earnings for the cutoff firm
in the economy.
The timing structure of the model is as follows:
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t = 0: All firms that want to enter the market make an upfront investment into the level
of corporate governance g ∈ [0, 1] that they want to establish at their firm. Better
corporate governance leads to more efficient control of their managers and thus to
a closer alignment of the manager’s incentives to the owner’s interests.
t = 1: All firms that want to enter the market need to hire a manager. Owners make
a ’take it or leave it’ contract offer to a manager, taking into account the value of
the manager’s reservation wage. The prospective manager receives the offer which
specifies a performance payment and the level of corporate governance investment
chosen in t = 0. This level of corporate governance allows a prospective manager to
infer how likely it is to entrench himself in order to pursue personal goals. Managers
in more weakly governed firms have a higher chance to remain uncaught when
shirking such that their incentives are less closely aligned with the owners’ interests.
Managers may decide to accept or decline the offer depending on their respective
reservation wage. Labor market clearing requires that the remaining agents that do
not get an offer for a management position become production workers.
t = 2: After a manager accepts the offer, he chooses to either exert effort or to shirk.
Whenever the manager chooses to shirk, the output production will fail. Whenever
the manager chooses to spend effort, there is a positive chance that the firm produces
output. The quality of corporate governance is introduced as a probability g with
that firm owners receive a signal on the expected production outcome. If the signal
indicates a failure of output production, firm owners can displace a manager in order
to obtain some liquidation rent.
t = 3: After the production occurred, all agents are compensated and profits are realized.
2.1 Preferences and Economic Endowments
Consider an economy that is populated by a mass of agents L. Agents can be employed as
production workers or as managers. Agents differ in their level of management skills but
they are equal in the skills that they provide as production workers. The distribution of
managerial skills is described by L(s) = L/s, where s ∈ [1,∞) is the skill level and L(s) is
the measure of agents with management skills at least as good as skill level s. Agents that
fill an occupation as production worker provide one efficiency unit of production labor,
independently of their management skills.
Furthermore, there exists a mass of production technologies whose quality distribution
is given by G(z) = T/z. Here, z ∈ (0,∞) is the quality of a technology and G(z) is
the measure of technologies that are at least as good as a technology with quality z.
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This implies that the number of available (however, bad) technologies is sufficient to
accommodate any number of managers in equilibrium. All production technologies are
owned by a mutual fund (the principal) that maximizes the individual profits of each firm
and redistributes them equally across the population.3
Consumer preferences can be described by a C.E.S. utility function over a set of differ-
entiated varieties J and a term Φ that captures any personal costs and benefits that are










where yj is the amount that is consumed of variety j and σ > 1 is the constant elasticity
of substitution.4 The term Φ includes all personal costs and benefits from corporate
governance and potential benefits from shirking which will be endogenized in the following
subsection.
2.2 Firms
Firms need three inputs in order to exist and produce output: a production technology,
a manager that exerts effort and production workers in proportion to the firm output.5
The productivity of a firm is determined by the quality of the production technology z
and the skill level s of the manager. I assume that management skills and production
technologies complement each other regarding the production of output. In particular,
the unit costs of production are given as




where w is the production labor wage. The parameter µ > 0 measures the influence of
the manager’s skill and the parameter κ > 0 the impact of the production technology on
firm productivity.
Firms charge a constant markup over their unit costs of production and a firm that
3This is a standard assumption in international trade with heterogeneous firms to abstract from any
wealth effects among economic agents.
4This implies that consumers spend xj = X (pj/P)
1−σ







is the price index in the economy and X the aggregate consumption expenditure.
5The occupational choice between production work and managerial work will be endogenized later,
when an equilibrium is determined. Unlike in Melitz (2003), where the production labor supply is fixed
and similar to Wu (2011), the allocation of agents into production worker jobs and managerial jobs
endogenously pins down the supply of production labor.
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produces output obtains operating profits Y (z, s) that are given as












XP σ−1 captures the size of the market from the perspective of
an individual firm. Markets are large if the elasticity of substitution between varieties is
low and the aggregate expenditure level X or the price index P are large.
However, firms can only produce output and obtain Y (z, s) if their manager exerts effort.
Managerial effort is not directly observable for outsiders which requires the provision
of sufficient incentives for managers. This rationalizes firm investments into corporate
governance in order to monitor managers or the offer of performance compensation in
order to provide monetary incentives for managers.
Remember that firm owners make an upfront decision on their investment into the level
of corporate governance g ∈ [0, 1] in period t = 0. Investments in corporate governance
are costly and generate linear personal costs (mw) g.6 These investment costs reflect the
owners’ ex-ante effort costs to set up a system in order to monitor managers ex-post.
In the following period t = 1, each firm needs to hire a manager in order to become active
on the market. A managerial contract specifies managerial compensation r ≥ 0 and
prospective managers can observe the level of corporate governance investments g ∈ [0, 1]
that the firm has made in period t = 0. Better corporate governance allows firms to
identify and displace unproductive managers more easily. I model this in the following
way. Before the surplus is realized, owners observe a signal on the expected firm surplus
with probability g. After observing this signal, managers can be displaced and owners
receive a fixed liquidation rent lw.7 This liquidation rent induces firm owners to displace
managers whenever they receive a negative signal on output production.
Managers can decide to either provide effort, in which case the output Y (z, s) is realized
with some positive probability ε. Alternatively, managers can choose to shirk which leads
to the complete failure of production. Shirking is beneficial for managers as they can
then obtain a private non-pecuniary benefit b when they remain uncaught, i.e. when
firm owners did not receive a signal. Therefore, a higher value of g disciplines managers
because higher investments in corporate governance decreases their expected benefits from
shirking. All agents are risk neutral and protected by limited liability.
6I choose to express the costs and benefits of corporate governance in terms of the production labor
wage rate w in order to simplify the notation when I derive the equilibrium solution. This simplifies
the characterization of an equilibrium in the open economy case and leaves the qualitative results of the
comparative static analyses unaffected.
7An empirical counterpart of this liquidation value could be the owner’s benefits of a merger or the
acquisition by another firm.
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ε (Y (z, s)− r (s)) + (1− ε) lwg (s)−mwg (s) . (4)
In order to motivate a manager to work, the choice of his compensation r (s) and the
degree of corporate governance g (s) inside the firm need to be incentive compatible such
that
εr (s) ≥ (1− g (s)) b. (5)
Equation (5) shows that ex ante, corporate governance and performance pay are substi-
tutes with respect to the provision of incentives. From the perspective of the manager,
a stricter level of corporate governance reduces his chances to obtain private benefits
such that incentive compatibility is achievable with lower levels of performance pay. Vice
versa, more performance pay makes effort provision more attractive such that less control
is required.
However, this substitutive relationship is impaired by the participation constraint. Man-
agers are only willing to work for the firm if their expected earnings are at least as large as
their reservation wages u (s). This imposes a minimum payment requirement u (s). The
manager’s expected income needs to give him at least his reservation wage such that the
participation constraint requires
εr (s) ≥ u (s) . (6)
In order to make the analysis interesting, I make the following assumptions.
Assumption.
(1) mw ∈ ((1− ε) lw, (1− ε) lw + b): the choice of g is non-trivial. If corporate gover-
nance investments were cheaper, firms would always invest. If instead corporate gover-
nance investments were more expensive, corporate governance investments would never be
profitable.
(2) εY (z, s) > lw: owners have no incentive to displace the manager and obtain the liq-
uidation value lw when they do not observe the production outcome.
(3) w < b: there are some firms in the economy that choose to invest in corporate gover-
nance such that there is variation in corporate governance across firms.
Given the assumptions from above, the optimal combination of remuneration r and gov-
ernance g is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. A firm that employs a manager with skill level s and a reservation wage




succeeds and makes an upfront investment into the level corporate governance g (s) =
1− u(s)
b
if u (s) ≤ b and g (s) = 0 if u (s) > b.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, the optimal incentive contract depends on the value of the manager’s reser-
vation wage. For managers that obtain a relatively large reservation wage u (s) > b, the
incentive compatibility constraint becomes redundant since the compensation is already
sufficiently large to incentivize the manager to work. This makes investments in corpo-
rate governance inefficient. For managers with a relatively low reservation wage u (s) ≤ b,
owners optimally choose the cheapest contract that keeps both constraints binding in
equilibrium such that they set incentives with a mix between corporate governance and
compensation. I refer to the appendix for a formal proof of proposition 1.
2.3 Equilibrium
In a next step, I establish the conditions that determine an equilibrium solution. This
allows me to characterize the compensation of managers and corporate governance choices
of firms in the economy. In an equilibrium, there is a stable assignment of management
skills to production technologies. Moreover, labor markets must clear and only firms with
expected non-negative profits will enter the market.
I begin with the assignment of managers to technologies to pin down the reservation
wages of managers. Complementarities between production technologies and management
skills in combination with a competitive labor market for managerial talent, lead to a
positive assortative matching of management skill levels to production technologies, as it
is standard in the assignment literature.8 This positive assortative matching keeps the
model tractable since it implies that the measure of the upper tail of the skill distribution
and the measure of the upper tail of the technology distribution need to be of equal size
for each matched firm pair (s, z) such that
L/s = T/z ⇔ z = ts,
where t ≡ T/L is a relative measure of the technology size in the economy. In order to
pin down the reservation wages u (s), I make use of a standard assignment equation as
8See for example Gabaix and Landier (2008) or Terviö (2008). Furthermore, consider the following
intuitive argument: Suppose there were two technology-skill matches (z1, s2) and (z2, s1) that form firms
in equilibrium with z1 < z2 and s1 < s2. The aggregate surplus could be increased by making the manager
with skill s1 the head of the firm with production technology z1 and the other manager with skill s2 the
head of the firm with z2 instead. Since any competitive equilibrium is efficient, this is a contradiction.
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in Gabaix and Landier (2008) or Monte (2011). In equilibrium, the marginal cost of a
slightly better manager equals the marginal benefit of a slightly better manager from the
perspective of the firm:9
∂εY (z, s)
∂s |z=z(s)
= u′ (s) . (7)
Differentiating the surplus (3) with respect to s and plugging z (s) = ts in, gives the
reservation wages:











where sc is the level of management skills of the marginal manager in the economy. This
manager runs the least productive firm that is active in the market and earns a wage
that is equal to the production worker wage rate w. Intuitively, the compensation of
managers increases with their skill s, market sizeM , the relative technological endowment
of the economy t and the contribution of managerial talent to firm productivity µ
κ+µ
.
Furthermore, reservation wages fall with the skill level of the marginal manager sc.
Moreover, only firms with positive expected net earnings will enter the market. Consider
the firm in the market with zero expected net earnings. Due to the positive assortative
assignment of production technologies to management skills, this marginal firm employs
the least-skilled manager with management skills sc. All agents with management skills
below sc will be employed as production workers and earn the production worker wage
rate w. Consequently, the marginal manager must be indifferent between an occupation
as production worker with a fixed wage rate w or an occupation as a manager with
a performance payment r whenever output production occurs such that his reservation
wage is given by u (sc) = w. According to proposition 1, the contract offered by the
marginal firm is characterized by a performance payment r (sc) = w/ε and the highest
level of governance investments in the economy g (sc) = 1 − w/b. This gives rise to the
following zero cutoff earnings condition which ensures that only firms with nonnegative





where ψ ≡ 1− (σ−1)(κ+µ) and the term λ ≡ ((1− w/b) (m− (1− ε) l) + 1) contains the
net cost of corporate governance for the marginal firm plus one.10 Intuitively, this curve
is downward sloping in the management skill sc since a higher management skill level sc
9Note, that the marginal cost of the manager do not include any marginal corporate governance costs
since corporate governance investments have been made in t = 0 and are therefore sunk in the hiring
stage t = 1.
10These net costs of corporate governance comprise the monitoring costs (1− w/b)m net of the expected
liquidation rent (1− w/b) (1− ε) l.
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would increase the productivity of the marginal firm. In order to restore zero earnings of
the marginal firm, the aggregate expenditure level in the economy X must decrease.
Next, I consider the clearing of labor markets. In contrast to the classical Melitz (2003)
model with heterogeneous firms, the labor supply is not fix in my model since the mass
of production workers depends on the number of managers and the number of firms in
the economy, respectively. The labor market clears when the aggregate expenditure on
production workers that is required to produce the aggregate output of all active firms
equals the aggregate earnings of those production workers. This gives rise to the following










The function (10) is upward sloping in sc. Intuitively, an increase in sc increases the
supply of production production workers since less agents in the economy are employed
as managers. To restore an equilibrium, the demand for production labor also needs to
increase. This increase occurs whenever the aggregate expenditure level X rises.
Since both curves intersect once, there exists a unique equilibrium solution for X and sc.
Setting both conditions equal gives a solution for the cutoff management skill sc and the
aggregate expenditure level X in the closed economy:
X =
σLλw
ε (σ − 1)λ+ ψ
sc = 1 +
ε (σ − 1)λ
ψ
. (11)
Given this aggregate expenditure level in the economy and the cutoff management skill
level, the reservation wages for managers can be stated as follows:










Equation (12) illustrates that the compensation of a manager increases with his relative
position to the marginal manager in the market. Since the level of compensation is in-
creasing with management skills, firms will choose different levels of corporate governance
investments to provide incentives. Managers with relatively high levels of management
skills have relatively high reservation wages u (s) since their impact on the profits that
firms make is large. Consequently, the firms that compete for the managers with the
highest management skills in the economy will invest less into corporate governance and
incentivize their managers with a high performance compensation. In contrast to the
largest firm in the economy, firms that employ managers at the lower end of the man-
agement skill distribution will invest into solid corporate governance to make sure that
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managers are appropriately incentivized.
I obtain the optimal level of corporate governance from plugging the equilibrium reserva-















if s ≤ s̃
0 if s > s̃.
(13)
Firms that employ managers with a skill level above s̃ do not invest into corporate gov-
ernance and only rely on performance compensation to incentivize their managers. Man-
agers with skills below s̃ are incentivized with a combination of performance payments









Note that s̃ increases proportionally with the cutoff management skill sc. A higher level
of the cutoff management skill increases the degree of product market competition and
therefore means ceteris paribus lower firm profits. Consequently, a higher cutoff manage-
ment skill level sc puts downward pressure on the compensation of managers which leads
to higher investments in corporate governance in the economy.
Another informative statistic that is immediately deductible from s̃ and describes the
state of corporate governance in the total economy is the fraction of firms that do not












Intuitively, this fraction of firms θ is large when the costs of corporate governance λ are
relatively large or when managers have little private benefits from shirking b and thus
require only little work incentives. The following proposition summarizes how firms in
the economy choose to provide incentives.
Proposition 2.
In a closed economy, there exists a threshold skill level s̃.
A fraction θ of the largest firms in the economy competes for managers with skill levels
s > s̃. These firms do not invest into corporate governance and provide managerial
incentives solely with performance compensation.
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The remaining firms that compete for managers with skill levels s ≤ s̃ incentivize managers
with investments into corporate governance and performance compensation.
Proof. See Appendix.
2.4 Technological Change and the Choice of Incentives
How does technological change affect the way how firms set up incentives? This section
illustrates the comparative statics of a technological change on the level of performance
payments and firm investments into corporate governance in the described framework.
There has been a debate in the economics literature that technological change is to a
large extent skill-biased in the sense that it increases the effectiveness of technologies
that disproportionally benefit the productivity of firms that employ relatively high-skilled
agents. For instance, the availability of computers and related information technologies
is particularly relevant for workers that frequently use these technologies.11
This skill-bias in technological change can be modeled as an exogenous increase in the
parameter κ which measures the influence of the production technology on the overall
firm productivity.12 A higher value for κ immediately translates into a more dispersed
productivity distribution since the productivity of firms with higher skilled agents im-
proves disproportionally.13 First, I consider the effects of skill-biased technological change
on the zero cutoff earnings condition. Then, I analyze how the effects on X and sc affect
corporate governance investment decisions across firms and how this ultimately changes
the share of firms θ that do not invest into corporate governance.
An increase in κ changes the zero cutoff earnings condition (9) and leaves the labor
market equilibrium clearing condition (10) unaffected since changes in the effectiveness of
technologies neither affect the aggregate production labor expenditure nor the earnings
on production labor. In order to understand how skill-biased technological change affects
the zero earnings firm, note that a skill-biased increase in the effectiveness of technologies
has two opposing effects on the surplus of this marginal firm. First, there is a positive
productivity effect since the marginal costs t
κsκ+µc
w
decrease. Second, there is a negative
market size effect that is due to a lower price index because all other firms also become
more productive. Since an increase in κ disproportionally benefits firms that employ
relatively high skilled agents, the negative effect on the price index dominates the positive
productivity effect for the marginal firm. To restore zero earnings for a given cutoff skill
11See Autor et al. (1998) for empirical evidence.
12See Monte (2011) who studies the effects of an increase in κ on the dispersion of wages.
13The elasticity of the firm productivity with respect to changes in κ is increasing in the employed skill
level s since e(κ) = κ ln(ts).
15
sc, the marginal firm now requires a larger expenditure level X to cover the corporate
governance costs to enter the market. This mechanism turns the zero cutoff earnings curve
outward which unambiguously increases X and the cutoff skill sc in the new equilibrium.
This skill-biased technological change has three effects on the threshold skill level s̃ from
equation (14). First, an increase of κ strengthens the contribution of the production tech-
nology to firm productivity and therefore weakens the bargaining position of the manager
and decreases reservation wages of managers (the bargaining effect). This decrease of
reservation wages translates to a lower share of weak governance firms in the economy
since lower performance payments require additional incentives from stricter monitoring.
Second, an increase of κ increases the marginal productivity of managers and thus has a
positive effect on reservation wages which reduces the threshold skill level s̃ and increases
the share of firms θ that do not invest into corporate governance (the productivity ef-
fect). Third, skill-biased technological change leads to a tougher selection among firms as
the cutoff skill sc increases such that reservation wages fall and s̃ increases (the selection
effect). This selection effect only affects the threshold skill level s̃ but leaves the share
of organizations with zero corporate governance investments θ unaffected as s̃ increases
proportionally with sc. Consequently, tougher selection from technological change affects
the number of firms but leaves the share of firms with weak governance unaffected. Nev-
ertheless, the bargaining effect and the productivity effect have an influence on θ. To see








The bargaining effect is captured by an increase of the denominator λµw+(κ+ µ) (b− w)
such that θ decreases. The positive productivity effect is captured by a decrease of the
exponent 1
(κ+µ)(σ−1)
such that θ rises. I show in the appendix that the productivity effect
outweighs the bargaining effect such that ∂θ
∂κ
> 0. The following proposition summarizes
how skill-biased technological change in the economy affects firm decisions to provide
incentives.
Proposition 3.
Technological change that is skill-biased (κ ↑) increases competition for the relatively high
skilled managers in an economy.
This leads to an increase in the fraction θ of firms that do not invest into corporate




The current section extends the model to an open economy version. I consider two sym-
metric countries that participate in intra-industry trade. Economic activities on the do-
mestic market are denoted with a subscript d and exporting activities with a subscript x.
An exporting firm needs to produce τ > 1 units of a good for 1 unit to reach the foreign
destination. Additionally, a firm needs to incur a fixed amount of production labor f to
sell to the export market. Formally, a firm that employs a manager with skill s in the
open economy setting faces the following objective function:
max ε (Yd(s) + IxYx(s)− r(s))− Ixfw − g (s) ((1− ε) lw −mw) , (16)
where Ix is an endogenous export participation indicator. Again, firms choose the perfor-
mance compensation r (s) and the level of corporate governance investment g (s) according
to proposition 1. Since exporting firms face identical demand elasticities on both markets,
the exporting price is a constant multiplier of the domestic price adjusted by the variable
trade cost: px(s) = τpd(s). Therefore, the operating profits from exporting are
Yx (s) = τ







Denote sd the management skill in the marginal domestic firm and sx the management
skill in the marginal exporting firm. Firms will choose to export whenever their produc-
tivity is large enough to cover the fix costs of exporting. Thus, the marginal exporter
obtains operating profits from exporting Yx(sx) that are just sufficiently large to cover the
fixed costs of entering the export markets such that εM (w−1tκsκ+µx )
σ−1
= τσ−1fw. The
management skill level of the marginal exporter sx can be written as a function of the








where I assume that (τσ−1f)
1
1−ψ > λ in order to make sure that there is any meaningful
exporting behavior of firms with sx > sd.































captures the effect of foreign competition on the price index.
14Otherwise, some firms would rather export than sell on the domestic market.
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If the economic distance between the two countries is small (low values for ∆ occur when-
ever f and τ are small), competition from foreign exporters lowers the domestic price
index. In the limit, when both economies are very remote and ∆ approaches infinity, the
price index converges to its closed economy version. An equilibrium in the open econ-
omy again requires that the labor market clearing condition and the zero cutoff earnings
condition are satisfied.
Consider the zero cutoff earnings condition in the open economy. The smallest domestic
firm in the economy faces additional competition from foreign exporters through a lower











For a given level of management skills sd the marginal domestic firm requires a higher
expenditure level X to survive in the market when the both countries become integrated
more closely and ∆ decreases. When the economic distance ∆ approaches infinity, equa-
tion (19) resembles the closed economy case.
Also the labor market clearing condition changes in the open economy. The aggregate ex-
penditure on production labor now consists of three components: besides the expenditure
on production labor to produce output for the domestic market, there is expenditure on
production labor to produce for the foreign market and additionally, expenditure on pro-
duction labor that is required to cover the fixed investments f to enter export markets.
The aggregate expenditure on production labor can again be found by integrating the
labor demand of an individual firm over all active firms and now includes the additional
labor expenditure to cover the fix costs of exporting. Similar to the closed economy case,
expenditure on production labor can be simplified to εX (σ − 1) σ−1 + fwLs−1x such that
















Here again, the additional factor λ
1
1−ψ∆−1 captures the additional labor demand for the
exporting activities of firms. For a given skill level sd globalization reduces the aggregate
expenditure levelX that is required to clear the labor market. This effect can be explained
by the effect of a trade integration on the selection of firms into export markets. With
lower trade costs, more firms select into export markets such that the expenditure on labor
to cover the fix exporting costs rises and less workers are engaged for output production
(for a fixed skill level sd) such that X is lower in the open economy for any value of sd.










ψ + ελ (σ − 1) + (ψ + ε (σ − 1))λ
1
1−ψ∆−1
sd = 1 +












The equilibrium function of reservation wages in the open economy now requires a case
distinction. Managers that are employed by exporting firms obtain an additional reser-










that arises from serving a larger
market. Trade opportunities allow them to additionally serve foreign markets such that




























+ w if s ≥ sx.
(22)
It is straightforward to analyze the comparative static effects of a trade cost reduction on
the choice of firms to set up incentives for managers.
2.6 Trade Liberalization and the Choice of Incentives
This section analyzes how a reduction of economic distance ∆ between both countries
affects the way how firms incentivize their managers. A reduction of economic distance
∆ between both countries, either stemming from a decrease of the variable or the fix
trade costs dτ < 0 or df < 0, has an effect on both, the labor market clearing and the
zero cutoff firm condition. Figure 1 illustrates the effects of a trade integration on the
domestic managerial cutoff skill level sd. If the economies become more integrated, the
labor market curve shifts downwards. Intuitively, better exporting opportunities allow the
labor market to clear at a lower expenditure level. Simultaneously, closer integration shifts
the zero cutoff earning curve upwards. A trade integration fosters import competition such
that the marginal domestic producer requires a larger expenditure level to break even.
These two effects lead to an unambiguous increase of the domestic managerial cutoff skill
sd. Furthermore, the cutoff skill of the marginal exporting firm sx falls since a lower
productivity level is sufficient to cover the fix trade costs and a larger share of firms
become exporters since ∂ [sd/sx] /∂∆ < 0.
Figure 1 about here
In the interest of a statement on the comparative statics of firm governance in an open
economy, I distinguish two cases: first the case with low trade openness (large ∆), then the
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case with high trade openness (small ∆). The effect of a trade liberalization on reservation
wages differ in those two cases which has different effects on the choice of incentives in
equilibrium.
Low Trade Openness
Suppose that both countries are very remote such that the selection of firms into exporting
is only efficient for a small share of firms. In this scenario, the export cutoff managerial
skill level of the marginal exporter sx is very high such that the sorting of skill levels is
as follows:
sd < s̃ < sx.
Since only very few firms export, most managers cannot benefit from trade liberalization
since these managers do not obtain an exporter wage premium. If the cutoff skill level
s̃ is smaller than the export cutoff skill level sx, all exporters (and additionally some
non-exporters) are weakly governed firms that do not invest into corporate governance.
The cutoff s̃ can again be evaluated as the skill level of the manager that has an outside
option with value b such that this manager is the least productive manager that is hired













+ w = b. (23)












which is identical as in closed economy version of the model. Obviously, θ is not affected
by changes in the openness of the economies. In this scenario, economic integration only
increases the reservation wages of the managers that are employed by the most productive
exporting firms. Only these managers obtain an exporter wage premium that allows them
to compensate the downward pressure on reservation wages arising from tougher import
competition. The remaining managers suffer from tougher selection via an increase in sd.
Since s̃ increases proportionally with sd, the fraction of weak governance firms θ remains
unaffected.
High Trade Openness
Next, suppose that both countries are relatively integrated such that sufficient firms serve
the export market. In this scenario, the export cutoff management skill level sx is very
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low such that the sorting of skill levels is as follows:
sd < sx < s̃.
This sorting implies that the firm that employs the manager with the organizational cutoff















+ w = b
which leads to the following term for the share of organizations with weak governance θ:
θ =
((











Now, the fraction of firms with no investments into corporate governance depends on the
degree of economic integration. A reduction in either the variable trade costs τ or the fix
trade costs f unambiguously increases the fraction θ. Intuitively, a reduction of trade costs
increases the reservation wages for a large fraction of the managers in the economy since
these become more productive and firms that compete for management skills are willing
to pay them more. Consequently, firms invest less into corporate governance and offer
more performance compensation. The following proposition summarizes how economic
integration through a reduction of trade costs affects firm decisions to provide incentives.
Proposition 4.
Consider a reduction in fix or variable trade costs in an open economy. This reduction in
trade costs increases the reservation wages of the highest skilled managers in the economy
which induces the largest firms to incentivize their managers with performance compensa-
tion instead of investing into corporate governance to monitor their managers.
If the open economy is sufficiently integrated such that sd < sx < s̃ a reduction in fix or
variable trade costs leads to an increase in the fraction θ of firms that do not invest into
corporate governance and provide incentives solely with performance compensation.
Proof. See Appendix.
3 Empirical Analysis
This section investigates the comparative static predictions of the model from propositions
3 and 4 empirically, using variation in managerial entrenchment opportunities and equity
compensation in large public industrial firms in the U.S. I begin with a brief description
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of the data sources and the variable construction, then describe the estimation strategy
and conclude with a discussion of the evidence.
3.1 Data
The empirical analysis draws on firm level data from two main sources. In order to
measure corporate governance quality at the firm level, I use the entrenchment index (E
index) from Bebchuk et al. (2009). This index combines information on six governance
provisions that capture managerial entrenchment opportunities and are associated with
adverse managerial behavior inside firms. The E index is constructed by counting how
many of the following six governance provisions are in place in a given firm-year: stag-
gered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes,
and supermajority requirements for mergers as well as for charter amendments. Four of
these six provisions are associated with limited voting power of shareholders (staggered
boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, supermajority requirements for mergers,
supermajority requirements for charter amendments), while the two remaining provisions
(poison pills and golden parachutes) are salient measures taken in preparation for hostile
offers which can be used by the executive board to prevent an unpopular merger leading
to their displacement. Bebchuk et al. (2009) argue that these six provisions are the most
relevant ones since they play a key role in the relation between corporate governance and
firm value.15 Information on the six different governance attributes is provided by the
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) and includes S&P 500 firms and a set of
additional firms. I use the final E index score that ranges between 0 to 6, based on the
number of these provisions that a firm provides in a given year such that higher values
correspond to more managerial entrenchment. Observations span the time period between
1990 and 2006 with gaps: there is information on the E index for the years 1990, 1993,
1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006.16
As the second main data source, I use information about executive compensation in quoted
U.S. corporations that is provided by BoardEx. BoardEx is a commercial business intel-
ligence service provider that collects remuneration details on business leaders across the
world. BoardEx provides information on the direct part of remuneration including fixed
compensation and performance payments. Furthermore, BoardEx intends to measure
equity-linked compensation. The equity-linked compensation measure includes the total
15These six provisions are also a subset of the GIM corporate governance index by Gompers et al.
(2003). However, while the GIM index captures governance practices in various areas of the organization,
the E index focuses on measuring governance practices related to adverse behavior of executive boards.
Therefore, the E index is a more direct proxy for the firms’ strength in monitoring managers.
16The E-index panel data are publicly available on Lucian Bebchuk’s website http://www.law.
harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml.
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value of awarded shares, the estimated value of awarded options17 and long-term incentive
plans (LTIPs) within a year. Since the company was registered only in 1999, the BoardEx
compensation panel data start in 1998.18
I match the entrenchment and the equity compensation panels with firm level balance
sheet information from Thomson Reuters Worldscope. Worldscope provides balance sheet
information and the main 4-digit SIC industry where each company is active in.
The industry level data that are used in the empirical analysis are obtained from three
different sources. First, I use the NBER CES manufacturing industry database to obtain
information on total factor productivity and value of shipments at the SIC 4-digit industry
level. Additionally, I use the UN Comtrade database to obtain U.S. trade flows (exports
and imports) at the SIC 4-digit level. My sectoral measures of trade openness build
on those two data sources. In order to capture changes in the effective market size at
the sectoral level; I divide exports by “domestic market size” (total value of domestic
shipments plus imports) at the SIC 4-digit level. Since this measure of export openness is
very dispersed across industries and also over time, I winsorize the sectoral trade measure
by taking natural logarithms. In order to capture the role of I.T. at the industry level, I use
the share of I.T. capital in total capital formation from the EUKLEMS database.19 The
Data Appendix provides summary statistics of all variables and more detailed information
about the construction of the data.
3.2 Empirical Modeling
My theoretical model indicates that large firms increase performance compensation and
reduce their investments into corporate governance when their industries become more
open to trade or when skill-biased technological change occurs. The rise in trade openness
and the I.T. revolution where two developments during the 1990s and early 2000s that
vastly changed the market environment faced by U.S. firms. Figure 2 illustrates the rise in
trade and information technologies in U.S. manufacturing between 1990 and 2006.20 The
left panel (a) shows an increase of the average exports relative to the value of domestic
shipments per 4-digit SIC manufacturing industry in the U.S. The right panel (b) plots
17Option values are based on a generalized Black-Scholes option pricing model using the latest closing
stock price; volatility is measured using a 100-day historic volatility; if option price expiry dates were
unavailable, BoardEx uses the U.S. average remaining period.
18Since BoardEx data are mostly formatted for business client applications, a preparation of the data
for academic purposes was needed before the data could be used for empirical work. Please see the Data
Appendix for more details on the necessary preparation steps and underlying assumptions.
19Data from EUKLEMS have also been used by Michaels et al. (2014) to estimate whether ICT has
polarized the demand for skilled labor.
20The data sources are the UN Comtrade database for industry exports, the EUKLEMS database for
the share of I.T. capital and the NBER CES manufacturing industry database for domestic shipments.
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the rise in I.T. capital relative to the total capital stock per 4-digit SIC manufacturing
industry in the U.S.
Figure 2 about here
Based on the two model propositions 3 and 4, I formulate the following testable prediction.
Empirical Prediction.
Firms allow for more managerial entrenchment and offer larger CEO compensation when
their industries are more open to trade or when production is more I.T. intensive.
In order to analyze how shareholders adjust incentives either via the arrangement of cor-
porate governance provisions which can facilitate or impede adverse managerial behavior
or via changes in executive compensation, I estimate empirical models of the following
type:
Yfjt = β1TRADEjt + β2ITjt +X
′
fjtδ + ηf + ηt + ufjt,
where Yfjt stands for the dependent variables entrenchment index or alternatively, for
the level of CEO compensation in a firm f that is active in industry j during period t.
The main regressors of interest are the export openness TRADEjt and the I.T. investment
intensity of the industry ITjt. Specifically, the variable TRADEjt is the natural logarithm
of exports divided by domestic shipments plus imports within a SIC 4-digit industry. The
variable ITjt is the share of I.T. capital investments divided by the total capital formation
of the industry. Information on I.T. investments is obtained from EUKLEMS. Since
EUKLEMS data are aggregated at the 2-digit NACE level, I match each firm into its
corresponding NACE industry. Furthermore, the vector Xfjt is a set of control variables.
In all regressions, I additionally control for industry total factor productivity, proxied by
the 4-factor TFP index obtained from the NBER CES manufacturing database, firm labor
productivity as well as firm size measured by total assets. When estimating models for
CEO compensation, I additionally include stock investment returns as a control. Since
there may be many unobservables that are broadly constant over the sample period but
correlated with governance provisions or executive compensation at the firm level and
trade or I.T. at the industry level, I include a firm fix effect ηf . This firm fix effect
controls for any time invariant unobservable at the firm or industry level. Moreover, all
estimations include a set of year dummies ηt to control for unobservable macroeconomic
shocks.
Furthermore, in order to identify the effects of trade shocks on managerial entrenchment
and CEO compensation, I follow an instrumentation strategy. My two instruments for
the export openness within an industry are an industry specific basket of real effective
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exchange rates and the maritime transportation costs for container trade from the U.S.
to Europe. The real effective exchange rate instrument is an industry specific basket
of the real effective exchange rate indices from Canada, China, Japan, Mexico and the
United Kingdom vis-à-vis the rest of the world. These five countries are the main U.S.
trading partners and I weight each of the five indices according to the SIC 4-digit specific
average import shares between 1991 - 1995. Maritime transport costs are obtained from
the OECD and measure the ad valorem transport costs for container trade from the U.S.
to the European Union at the HS-1998 6-digit product level. Here, I merge the product
level data to SIC 4-digit industries. I refer to the Data Appendix for a more detailed
description of the instrumental variables. While the exchange rate instrument captures
changes in comparative advantages over time, the ad valorem maritime transport costs
are a proxy for iceberg type trade costs.
3.3 Results
Table 1 shows results for regressions of the entrenchment index on the industry measures
of export openness and I.T. intensity. Generally, the estimates suggest that higher levels
of industry export openness and I.T. investments are associated with higher levels of
managerial entrenchment. In the OLS regressions in columns (1) and (2), both coefficients
for export openness and IT investments are significant at the 5% level. A problem with
estimating these equations is the endogeneity of industry trade and information technology
due to reversed causality or unobserved shocks at the industry level that are correlated
with managerial entrenchment and explanatory variables. In order to identify the effect
of a trade shock on managerial entrenchment, I instrument export openness with the
exchange rate basket and maritime transport costs. The correlation of the instruments
is meaningful in the sense that appreciations of the foreign currencies and reductions in
transport costs from the U.S. to Europe lead to more exports by U.S. industries. The
preferred specification is presented in column (3), where both instruments are used. The
Angrist-Pischke F -statistic to test for weak identification is 5.99 which rejects the null
hypothesis of a weakly identified model for a maximum bias of 30% IV size. The p-value of
the Hansen J-statistic to test for overidentification is 0.94 and thus, the null hypothesis of
an overidentified model is not rejected. The parameter estimate for the export openness
effect of 0.542 suggests that a one within firm standard deviation increase of export
openness from its mean increases the entrenchment index by 0.13 points which is about
25% of the within firm standard deviation of the entrenchment index. The estimate of
the I.T. investment effect of 5.386 suggests that a one within firm standard deviation of
the I.T. investment measure increases the entrenchment index by 0.09 points. Thus, the
estimates support the model prediction that large public firms allowed for more managerial
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entrenchment when their industries became more open and more I.T. intensive.
Next, consider the effect of trade and I.T. on CEO compensation. Table 2 shows results
for regressions that analyze the association between CEO compensation and the industry
measures of export openness and I.T. intensity. The specifications of the estimations
include the same control variables from the previous models and I additionally include
the total investment return (i.e. the stock return corrected for any dividend payments
and stock splits) to control for variation in firm performance. The estimates suggest
that executive compensation, both in total amounts and the equity linked parts, are
positively associated with industry export openness and I.T. investments. Notably, the
correlation between industry exports and the maritime transport cost instrument is very
small compared to those in Table 1. The reason lies in the variation of the transport
cost variable over time: while transport costs decreased until 2000, they remained fairly
flat since 2000.21 Since the BoardEx sample begins in 1998, maritime transport costs
do not seem to be the most determining factor for export openness. Consequently, my
preferred IV specification uses variation in real effective exchange rates as the instrument
and is presented in column (3) for total CEO compensation and in column (5) for the
equity-linked part of CEO compensation. Here, the Angrist-Pischke F -statistics for weak
identification are 5.66 (3), respectively 6.33 (5). The estimated coefficients for export
openness suggest an elasticity of total CEO payments to export openness of 2.55 and
an equity-linked compensation elasticity to export openness of 2.72. Moreover, a higher
I.T. investment intensity is associated with higher CEO compensation. Overall, these
estimates also support the model prediction that large public firms offered higher CEO
compensation when their industries became more open and more I.T. intensive.
4 Conclusion
This paper analyzes how the creation of incentives with performance compensation and
control is affected by changes in firms’ market environment. To study this question, I
integrate a stylized model of performance compensation and corporate governance in-
vestments into a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms and human capital.
Since technologies and management skills are complementary in terms of firm productiv-
ity, a positive assortative assignment of skills to technologies arises in equilibrium. The
most productive firms endogenously choose an organization where governance is weak
and managers can extract rents because investments into stronger corporate governance
21See Figure 4 in the Data Appendix for a plot of the mean maritime transport costs across industries
over time. Furthermore, a regression of export openness on transport costs and a dummy variable that
equals 1 after the year 1998 shows that the negative association between transport costs and U.S. exports
diminishes significantly after 1998.
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become inefficient incentive mechanisms when firms are constraint to pay high wages to
compete for managerial talent.
The model relates to a puzzle in the development of CEO compensation: while incen-
tive compensation has become more and more prominent over time, incentive provision
via better control inside the firm has fallen behind. This pattern can be explained by
changes in the firms’ market environment through globalization or technological change.
Trade liberalizations and skill-biased technological change toughen the competition for
managerial talent and thereby induce firms to allow for more managerial entrenchment
on average.
I analyze this prediction empirically with data on managerial entrenchment opportunities
and CEO compensation in large public industrial companies in the U.S. and find positive
effects of sectoral openness and the contribution of I.T. on managerial entrenchment inside
firms and the compensation of managers.
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Table 1: Managerial Entrenchment, Export Openness, and I.T. Investments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Method OLS OLS IV IV IV
Dependent Variable Entrenchment Index Entrenchment Index Entrenchment Index Entrenchment Index Entrenchment Index
Ln Export Openness 0.104** 0.107** 0.542** 0.980 0.527***
(0.0513) (0.0520) (0.226) (0.681) (0.183)
IT Investment Intensity 4.121** 5.386*** 4.985** 5.350***
(1.941) (1.980) (2.314) (2.022)
First Stage:
Real Effective Exchange Rates 0.0054** 0.0062**
(0.0026) (0.0029)
Maritime Transport Costs -0.817*** -0.787**
(0.312) (0.307)
Fix Effects Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year
Observations 3,898 3,898 3,591 3,748 3,591
Number of Firms 980 980 802 830 802
Sample Period 1993-2006 1993-2006 1993-2006 1993-2006 1993-2006
R-squared 0.090 0.092 - - -
Notes: The dependent variable is the entrenchment index of firm f in industry j in year t that ranges from 0 (good governance) to 6 (many entrenchment
opportunities). The main regressors ln export openness and IT investment intensity, are the natural logarithm of exports relative to domestic shipments
plus imports and the share of I.T. investments in total capital formation in industry j and year t, respectively. All estimations additionally control
for 4-factor TFP at the industry level (SIC 4-digit level, from NBER), firm labor productivity and total firm assets, all in natural logarithms. Angrist
and Pischke F-statistics are 5.99 (3), 4.73 (4) and 6.59 (5). The p-value for the overidentification test (Hansen J-statistic) in specification (3) is 0.94.
Standard errors in parentheses and robust to clustering at the industry level (SIC 4-digit level). ***, **, * denote 1, 5, 10% significance.
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Table 2: Executive Compensation, Export Openness, and I.T. Investments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Method OLS IV IV IV IV
Dependent Variable Ln CEO Total Pay Ln CEO Total Pay Ln CEO Total Pay Ln CEO Equity Pay Ln CEO Equity Pay
Ln Export Openness -0.0717 3.133* 2.550** 3.156 2.723*
(0.0878) (1.801) (1.257) (2.067) (1.509)
IT Investment Intensity 24.42*** 68.91** 57.83*** 84.35** 74.25***
(8.150) (28.19) (21.00) (35.72) (27.17)
First Stage:
Real Effective Exchange Rates 0.0054** 0.0069** 0.0058** 0.0072**
(0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0029)
Maritime Transport Costs 0.0024 0.0027
(0.0051) (0.0046)
Fix Effects Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year
Observations 4,702 4,579 4,694 4,234 4,340
Number of Firms 671 649 663 637 650
Sample Period 1998-2006 1998-2006 1998-2006 1998-2006 1998-2006
R-squared 0.084 - - - -
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of CEO total pay or equity compensation in firm f in industry j in year t. The main regressors
ln export openness and IT investment intensity, are the natural logarithm of exports relative to domestic shipments plus imports and the share of
I.T. investments in total capital formation in industry j and year t, respectively. All estimations additionally control for 4-factor TFP at the industry
level (SIC 4-digit level, from NBER), firm labor productivity, total firm assets, all in natural logarithms, as well as stock returns. Angrist and Pischke
F-statistics are 2.39 (2), 5.66 (3), 2.89 (4) and 6.33 (5). The p-value for the overidentification test (Hansen J-statistic) are 0.16 (2) and 0.21 (4).
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Figure 2: The increase in trade and information technologies in U.S. manufacturing in-
dustries between 1990 - 2006.
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Cuñat, Vicente and Maria Guadalupe. How Does Product Market Competition Shape
Incentive Contracts? Journal of the European Economic Association, 3(5):1058–1082, 2005.
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Proof of Proposition 1
To ease the notation, I will drop the function argument · (s) throughout the proof. The
owner’s problem is given as follows:
maxr,g ε (Y − r) + (1− ε) lwg −mwg
s.t.
εr ≥ (1− g) b
εr ≥ u
with mw ∈ ((1− ε) lw, (1− ε) lw + b). This assumption ensures that the choice of g
is nontrivial. Governance would be always g = 1 if mw < (1− ε) lw and g = 0 if
mw > (1− ε)mw + b.
To find the optimal contract, the following case distinction is necessary:
Case i) u > b: in that case the incentive constraint is slack whenever the participation
constraint is satisfied. Consequently, the incentive constraint may be neglected and the
agent receives a performance payment r = u/ε. Since incentives do not matter and to save
on governance costs, the owner leaves all the power to shirk to the manager and chooses
g = 0 (since (1− ε) lw −mw < 0).
Case ii) u ≤ b: This case is somewhat less trivial since here it depends on the level of
governance g which constraint will bind. More governance increases the expected liquida-
tion value ((1− ε) lwg) and rises monitoring costs (mwg). Since mw > (1− ε) lw, more
governance is costly for the owner. Nevertheless, there is a positive effect of governance:
stricter governance creates incentives for the agent to exert effort. Suppose that the owner
sets governance so weak such that g < 1 − u/b. Then, the incentive constraint would re-
quire that r ≥ (1− g) b/ε. Thus, it is inefficient to reduce governance because it requires
a relatively stronger increase in performance pay r. Next, suppose that g > 1 − u/b such
that only the participation constraint binds. Since governance bears a cost for the owner,
she can improve by reducing g such that both constraints are still satisfied.
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Proof of Proposition 2
Derivation of the Equilibrium
The derivation of the equilibrium is similar to Monte (2011). Consider first the zero
cutoff earnings condition. The net earnings of the least productive firm that is active in


















(m− (1− ε) l)w = 0. (26)
The earnings of this marginal firm depend on its management skills sc and the market






XP σ−1. The market size M depends itself on the economy price
index P which again depends on the cutoff skill level sc. In order to resolve this issue, I
resolve M and state it in terms of the aggregate expenditure X and the cutoff skill level
sc.
To solve for the price index and to save on notation, I define the term ψ ≡ 1−(σ−1)(κ+µ)
which needs to be positive such that the price index exists. Intuitively, this means that
the price index cannot be pushed towards zero by an individual firm. The C.E.S. price
index can now be written as a function of fundamentals and the management skill sc itself.
I obtain the price index from integrating over all prices that firms across the managerial





















Plugging the price index and the expenditure level X into equation (26) and rearranging





where λ ≡ ((1− w/b) (m− (1− ε) l) + 1).
Consider next the labor market clearing condition. The supply of production labor is vari-
able since it depends on the number of firms and therefore on the mass of agents that will
be employed as managers. However, the labor market clears if the aggregate expenditure
on production workers to produce the aggregate output is equal to the aggregate earnings
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of those production workers:
ˆ ∞
sc
ε (x (i)− Y (i))Li−2di = Lw(1− s−1c ). (28)
The left hand side of equation (28) integrates the difference between expected revenues
and the expected surplus over all firms and thus corresponds to the aggregate expenditure
on production labor in the economy. The right hand side corresponds to the aggregate
earnings of production workers. A firm uses 1/ϕj units of labor per unit of output and
produces qj units of output with probability ε. The demand for production labor of an
individual firm can be written in terms of prices since qj = xj/pj = XP
σ−1p−σj and
































Setting this expression equal to the aggregate supply from above gives the labor market











Figure 3 illustrates the zero cutoff earnings condition and the labor market clearing con-













s−1c ⇔ sc = 1 +
ε (σ − 1)λ
ψ
.



























Figure 3: Determination of the closed economy equilibrium in the (X, sc) locus.












Choice of Corporate Governance Investments
Consider next the skill level s̃ above that firms do not invest into corporate governance.
According to proposition 1 this cutoff is given by the firm that employs the manager with











+ w = b.















+ w = b









The fraction of firms that do not invest into corporate governance follows directly from s̃.
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Proof of Proposition 3
Consider the effects of an increase in κ in the model. While the labor market clearing
condition is left unaffected, there are two opposing effects on the zero cutoff earnings
conditions: a positive productivity effect and a negative price index effect. Since an
increase in κ disproportionally benefits the productivity of the competing firms, skill-










∂ [1− (σ − 1)(κ+ µ)]
∂κ
∂ [1 + ψ−1 (ε (σ − 1)λ)]
∂ψ
= [−(σ − 1)]
[






















σλLw (ψ + ελ(σ − 1))−1
]
∂ψ
= [−(σ − 1)]
[




(ψ + ελ(σ − 1))2
> 0.
In order to evaluate how skill-biased technological change affects the fraction of firms θ








A rise in κ has two effects on θ: a negative bargaining effect and a positive productivity
effect. The negative bargaining effect is captured by an increase of the denominator such
that θ decreases. The positive productivity effect is captured by the decrease of the
exponent such that θ rises.
In order to evaluate the sign of the overall effect, I take the logarithm of θ and consider
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(κ+ µ) (σ − 1)
(b− w)
λµw + (κ+ µ) (b− w)
=
1











λµw + (κ+ µ) (b− w)
)
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captures the positive productivity effect while the
term − (κ+µ)(b−w)
λµw+(κ+µ)(b−w)
corresponds to the negative bargaining effect.
This positive productivity effect outweighs the negative bargaining effect if and only if
ln
(




(κ+ µ) (b− w)
λµw + (κ+ µ) (b− w)
,
which is always fulfilled since the left hand side of this inequality is strictly larger than one
while the right hand side is always strictly smaller than one. Consequently, skill-biased
technological change unambiguously increases the share of firms with g = 0 in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4
Derivation of the Equilibrium
Since firms face identical demand elasticities in both markets, the operating profit ratio





























sd. After exchanging variables and integrating over the skill
















































1−ψ to restate the open economy




















Then, I derive the zero cutoff earnings condition for the open economy case. Again, the





(m− (1− ε) l)w + w. The
left hand side can be written in terms of X and sd such that:



















(m− (1− ε) l)w+w yields the zero cutoff earnings condition




























The labor market clearing condition now requires to incorporate earnings from production
workers that are employed to produce output for the foreign market or for the fix invest-
ment to gain market access. However, the term for the aggregate earnings of production






















































































X + fwLs−1x .
Setting this term for the aggregate expenditure on production labor equal to the total

































Setting both equilibrium conditions equal allows to solve first for the domestic cutoff























sd = 1 +











Note that the domestic cutoff management skill increases whenever economic distance
falls and that lim∆→∞ sd = sc. Plug the solution for sd into the zero cutoff earnings

































Also the aggregate expenditure level equals the expenditure level in the closed economy
case when the index of economic distance ∆ approaches infinity. Furthermore, note that
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∆(ελ (σ − 1) + ψ) + λ
1
1−ψ (ψ + ε (σ − 1))
)2 > 0.






















































Effects of a Trade Integration
Consider the effect of a trade integration (∆ ↓) on the fraction of firms with no investments
into corporate governance θ. 2 different scenarios need to be distinguished:
1. low trade openness: the fix and/or variable trade costs are large that only the must
productive firms choose to serve the export markets such that the sorting of cutoff
skill levels is sd < s̃ < sx.
2. high trade openness: the fix and/or variable trade costs are sufficiently small that
relatively many firms choose to serve the export markets such that the sorting of
cutoff skill levels is sd < sx < s̃.



























































such that s̃ and θ are:
s̃ =
((



























Preparation of the BoardEx Data
Before compensation data from BoardEx could be applied in the empirical models, a
number of preparation steps were necessary. Since BoardEx includes both, executives
and supervisory managers, the latter were excluded from the sample throughout. Fur-
thermore, BoardEx reports several distinct incomes for some executives that hold different
positions within the board of the same firm. Those incomes have been aggregated at the
manager-firm-year level to obtain the aggregate executive compensation. The next step of
preparation involved the deletion of double entries: Although most data items stem from
annual report data, there is also some reporting from quarterly announcements included.
Those data points from quarterly announcements have been excluded. Furthermore, re-
porting periods have been assimilated by switching from accounting periods which start
at different months depending on each firm in the sample to calendar years. Since job
titles are not perfectly consistent, CEOs were identified as the highest paid executive in
each firm in a given year.
Construction of the Instrumental Variables
Real Effective Exchange Rate Baskets
One variable that I use as an instrument for trade openness is the weighted average of real
effective exchange rates rt (c) of the top 5 U.S. export destinations c: Canada, Mexico,
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Great Britain, China and Japan. Each weight αj (c) is the average country c’s share of
exports relative to the total exports of those five countries from the U.S. during 1991 -
1995 at the industry level j (at the SIC 4-digit level):
αj (c) =
Ø exportsj (c)∑5




αj (c) rt (c)
Maritime Transport Costs
The data on maritime transport costs are obtained from the OECD. A detailed description
of the database is provided in Korinek (2011). Importer is the European Union (EU15)
and exporter are the United States. The data measure ad valorem maritime transport
costs for container trade at the commodity level. Commodities are classified based on the
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Figure 4: Maritime transport costs in value added container trade from the U.S. to Europe.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
variable observations mean min max std. dev.
entrenchment index 12,045 2.32 0 6 1.34
ln CEO total pay 13,675 8.35 0 15.08 1.24
ln CEO equity pay 12,442 8.00 -1.10 15.08 1.55
ln openness 19,714 -2.41 -9.45 0.654 1.30
IT investment intensity 60,367 0.0906 0.00022 0.209 0.060
ln tfp index 22,196 0.2005 -0.749 3.79 0.758
ln firm labor productivity 34,282 4.36 -2.65 11.46 1.03
ln total assets 42,724 13.68 -4.34 21.36 1.87
total investment return 39,904 0.73 -0.9999 5144.16 35.25
REER basket 23,052 99.60 72.25 157.90 8.72
maritime transport costs 18,469 0.04151 0.00015 16.97 0.18
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Entrenchment index from Bebchuk et al. (2009). The index ranges from 0 (good
corporate governance - little entrenchment) to 6 (bad corporate governance - large
entrenchment) and counts how many of the following attributes are applied in a
company in a given year: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments,
poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers as well as
for charter amendments. Information on the six different governance attributes is




Natural logarithm of the total compensation in 1000 USD of the highest-paid officer in
the firm during a given year.
Data source: BoardEx database
ln CEO equity
pay
Natural logarithm of the equity-linked compensation in 1000 USD of the highest-paid
officer in the firm during a given year.
Data source: BoardEx database
ln openness Natural logarithm of openness in %, where openness is exports/(domestic shipments +
imports). All variables are at the 4-digit SIC industry level for the main industry of each
firm in the sample.
Data sources: exports and imports are obtained from the UN COMTRADE WITS
database http://wits.worldbank.org/; domestic shipments are from the NBER CES
Manufacturing Industry database http://www.nber.org/nberces/
IT investment
intensity
Share of I.T. investments in total capital formation for the main industry of the firm at
the ISIC Rev. 3 2-digit level.
Data source: http://www.euklems.net/
ln tfp index Natural logarithm of a total factor productivity index on the SIC 4-digit level based on
4 factors of production (production workers, non-production workers, material inputs,
capital) with the base year 1987, where the index takes the value 1.
Data source: NBER-CES Mft. Industry database http://www.nber.org/nberces/
ln firm labor
productivity
Natural logarithm of the difference between sales and costs of goods sold per employee.
Data source: Thomson Worldscope database
ln total assets Natural logarithm of total firm assets in 1000 USD.
Data source: Thomson Worldscope database
total investment
return
Stock return in % corrected for dividend payments. total investment return = 100% x
((market price year end + dividends p. share + special dividends) / last year’s market
price year end) - 1)
Data source: Thomson Worldscope database
REER basket weighted average of the real effective exchange rates of top 5 U.S. trading partners
Canada, Mexico, Great Britain, China and Japan. Weights are the country share of U.S.
imports during 1991-1995 at the SIC 4-digit level. REER are domestic prices relative to
the world price (larger REER means greater comparative advantage for the U.S.)




Ad valorem maritime transport costs for container shipments from the U.S. to EU15 at
the 4-digit SIC industry level for the main industry of each firm in the sample.
Data source: OECD MTC database
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